Svmuu reported that Andre Cronje stated most current decentralized finance (DeFi) protocols no longer qualify as "DeFi in the strict sense" and are closer to commercial systems operated by teams. This has sparked industry division over whether "circuit breakers" should be introduced to mitigate attack risks.
In an interview, Andre Cronje pointed out that early DeFi centered on immutable smart contracts, but today many protocols rely on upgradeable contracts, multi-signature permissions, off-chain infrastructure, and manual operational processes. In essence, they have transitioned from "immutable public goods" to "operable, for-profit businesses." He noted that against the backdrop of recent security incidents, including DeFi attacks involving approximately $280 million and $293 million, industry risks have expanded from simple smart contract vulnerabilities to "Web2-style risks" such as infrastructure issues, permission controls, and social engineering attacks.
Regarding risk management, Cronje's firm Flying Tulip recently introduced circuit breakers that delay or queue withdrawals during abnormal fund outflows, providing an emergency response window of about six hours to prevent systemic bank runs and further losses.
However, this mechanism has also sparked controversy. Michael Egorov believes that circuit breakers may introduce new centralized attack surfaces. If controlled by signers or administrators, they could instead become new security vulnerabilities or sources of freezing risk. He emphasized that DeFi design should minimize human intervention rather than increase manual control points. Industry analysts pointed out that this debate essentially reflects how DeFi is shifting from the ideal model of "code is law" toward a practical architecture of "hybrid governance plus operational control," while the security boundaries are being redefined. (Cointelegraph)